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Given the current trend in global emissions, the latest round of climate change negotiations at 
the Durban meeting of December 2011 (for the adoption of a comprehensive global treaty on 
climate change mitigation as soon as possible—and no later than 2015—and to come into 
force in 2020) has hardly shown the results one would have hoped for. Even for the most 
optimistic, it remains unclear whether we can expect a successful negotiating outcome by 
2015. There are inherent difficulties associated with climate change negotiations, ranging 
from which countries should bear most responsibility for a given emission reduction target to 
the assessment of a globally efficient time path for pricing harmful greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs): and these difficulties become even more complex and challenging under the 
pervasive uncertainty of climate science and the uncertainty about the feedback loop between 
climate damages and economic growth. During the past decades, the environmental 
economics literature has provided important insights regarding the design of environmental 
fiscal policies and treaties but there is a host of issues that remain relatively unexplored. For 
instance, little do we know about the cooperative solution of carbon and trade policies when 
climate change affects the productive possibilities of countries. In this context, it is also not 
obvious whether observed policies could be improved upon in such a way that all countries 
gain in welfare. It remains also unclear what the carbon extraction path should be in the 
absence of a comprehensive treaty (such as, for example, if environmental policy is 
unilaterally chosen subject to an agreed ‘ceiling’ in global temperature). Though carbon 
pricing instruments like carbon taxes, cap-and-trade and hybrids have been well studied, not 
much is known about their properties in the presence of ‘offset’ schemes such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism. More work is also required to understand the strategic implications 
of the uncertainty surrounding climate change and how this affects, for example, the choice 
of climate change strategy (‘precautionary’ or ‘wait and see’), how uncertainty impacts on the 
propensity of countries to sign a climate treaty, and the extent to which the possibility of a 
climate catastrophe fosters or hinders cooperation. Understanding political economy issues is 
also vital in tackling climate change because efficient climate policies stand little chance of 
being successfully negotiated and implemented if they do not receive the support of the 
                                                 
1  The papers that appear in the special issue were all contributed papers to the “Environment and 
Sustainability Forum” that took place at the University of Exeter in April 2011. All papers have been 
subjected to the standard Journal of Environmental Economics and Management refereeing process. We 
thank the participants of the conference and the Editor of JEEM, Dan Phaneuf, for his encouragement and 
advice. We also thank the University of Exeter Business School for its generous support and, certainly not 
least, the referees who provided invaluable help in the evaluation process of these papers.     
electorate. The papers in the special issue of the Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management are precisely devoted to this broad research agenda. 
1. Introduction 
 
Climate change is a global externality: individual emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
typically ignore the aggregate damage they inflict on others, thereby emitting more than is 
desirable from a global perspective. Climate change thus suffers from a collective action 
problem: a country acting unilaterally will not find it in its best interest to price emissions 
sufficiently high—and consistent with the common good—since its perceived marginal 
damage from emitting is small relative to the global marginal damage. From a global 
perspective, therefore, uncoordinated environmental policies will be set at inefficiently low 
levels.  
 
Climate change is a particularly complex externality for a number of reasons. First, there are 
large asymmetries regarding the historical contribution to the current stock of emissions, the 
current contribution to the stock (80% of current emissions are produced by the high income 
countries) but also the source of future contributions with the growth in emissions most likely 
being sourced from non-OECD countries. Second, the impact of climate change are 
asymmetrically distributed, with a large burden falling on developing countries with low 
adaptation capabilities. Third, most efficient climate policies will mainly benefit high income 
groups but impose a proportionally high burden on low income groups if not associated with 
appropriate compensation measures. Fourth, the inertia of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere means that abatement costs—and the benefits from reduced damages—are spread 
over a long time horizon, requiring a long-term view to address the climate change problem 
in a meaningful way, but political decisions are typically taken over a shorter horizon.2 Fifth, 
the pervasive uncertainty in climate science and the difficulties of understanding the 
complexity of climate change impacts makes it difficult to gain political support for taking 
serious climate change actions. Finally, the very fact that more than 200 countries are 
involved in this externality problem does not lend support to the hope that the public ‘bad’ 
problem can be solved through social interaction, norms, and reciprocity as observed in small 
communities (Ostrom and Waler, 2003). 
 
All this raises a host of issues for the analysis of environmental policy and, in particular, how 
to foster cooperation between countries in addressing this global externality. Though the 
extant literature on international agreements has, to date, provided important insights, much 
remains to be learnt.3 For instance, there has been little formal analysis of how a cooperative 
solution of carbon and trade policies should be designed when climate change affects the 
productive possibilities of countries. In this context, it is also unclear how observed policies 
could be improved upon such that all countries gain—a basic prerequisite to receive support 
                                                 
2  The four issues are also related to the intra- and inter-generational equity concerns. See, for example, Stern 
(2007), Dasgupta (2007), and Weitzman (2009). 
3  For surveys of international climate agreements see Barrett (2003), and Finus (2003, 2008). 
for a cooperative policy. It remains also unclear what the carbon extraction path should be if 
unilateral environmental policy is subject to an agreed ‘ceiling’ in global temperature. 
Though carbon pricing instruments, carbon taxes, cap-and-trade and hybrids are well studied, 
very little is known about their properties in the presence of ‘offset’ schemes—such as the 
Clean Development Mechanism—and under imperfectly competitive markets. Political 
economy issues are also vital in tackling climate change. Even deeper challenges arise—with 
profound implications for policy design and environmental agreements—from the pervasive 
uncertainty in the science of climate change and the prospect of catastrophes.   
 
The papers in this Special Issue address a wide range of policy-relevant issues that are of 
direct importance in addressing the challenges to developing an effective global agreement on 
climate change policy. Given the timetable set by the Durban meeting in December 2011, the 
challenges in progressing climate negotiations are both pressing and significant. This creates 
an important agenda for environmental economists to provide insights into the factors that 
will likely drive forthcoming climate negotiations to a meaningful and effective outcome. 
The papers in the Special Issue provide an excellent example of insights of what the 
economics profession can offer on this issue. 
 
This Introduction will attempt to provide a brief, and rather selective, overview of some of 
the analytical issues that have arisen in the literature. Though tempting, we will not provide a 
detailed ‘reader’s guide’ to the individual papers in this Special Issue. The difficulty with 
pursuing such a task is that each paper discusses so many facets which makes it difficult to do 
justice to all aspects in a short space. Instead, we will place the papers contributed to this 
Special Issue in a broader context.4 It is clear that all papers presented in this Special Issue 
deal with a topic that is not only policy relevant but also extraordinarily complex and which 
poses specific challenges. We hope the challenges highlighted in this Special Issue will 
provide a springboard for further research on the subject. 
2. Some items on the agenda  
 
Given the current trend in global emissions, the latest round of climate change negotiations at 
the Durban meeting in December 2011 (for the adoption of a comprehensive global treaty on 
climate change mitigation as soon as possible—and no later than 2015—and to come into 
force in 2020) has hardly shown the urgency one would have hoped for and it remains 
unclear whether there will be a successful outcome by 2015. We highlight several issues on 
the current agenda and comment on how the papers in this Special Issue relate to them. 
 
International Cooperation and Trade Policy The most difficult challenge is the design of an 
architecture that encourages participation among the world’s largest GHGs emitters and 
                                                 
4  More comprehensive overviews can be found in Finus (2001), Copland and Taylor (2004), Aldy et al. 
(2010), Chen and Woodland (2013), and Jones et al. (2013).  
implements emission ceilings significantly different from the business-as-usual path.5 If past 
experience from previous climate change negotiations is any guide, there is no room for 
anyone to be overly optimistic about a successful negotiating outcome by 2015.  
 
Full international cooperation is needed to limit concerns about international competitiveness 
and emissions leakage. A fully coordinated approach would require an appropriate balance of 
efficiency and equity considerations. Kotsogiannis and Woodland (this issue) show—within 
an international trade framework in which the global impact of emissions is through 
productive factors—that such an approach would involve uniform carbon pricing across all 
countries (with international transfers6 addressing cross-country equity issues). Such a policy 
is also production efficient. In the absence of international transfers—distributional issues 
become a major concern in climate change negotiations7—uniform carbon pricing is no 
longer feasible: carbon taxes now have to reflect equity considerations too.8 In this case, 
constrained Pareto-optimality requires that low-income countries tax emissions at a lower 
rate than high-income countries.  
 
The Pareto efficiency characterisation is important but it also relevant to know if observed 
policies could be improved upon in such a way that every country gains in welfare terms. 
Kotsogiannis and Woodland (this issue) show that one can envisage environmental policy 
reforms that can deliver—starting from a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium—welfare 
improvements in all countries. Such a policy reform would be one, for instance, that closes 
the ‘gap’ between existing carbon taxes and the optimal ones and redistribute the efficiency 
gains through cross-country transfers. There are, of course, important practical issues around 
the implementation of such reforms and progress, for mainly political reasons, is likely to be 
painfully hard.  
 
The Political Game of Cooperation A fully coordinated approach is not the likely outcome in 
the short to medium term. There are, though, signs of unilateral action and binding 
commitments—and partial coordination by a subset of countries—on mitigating climate 
change. The European Trading System, for example, covers 31 countries. Moreover, the 
European Union has proposed a 20 percent emission reduction by 2020 which they will 
increase to 30 percent if matched by other countries (though what ‘matching’ means exactly 
remains unspecified). More recently, Mexico has unilaterally adopted ambitious legally 
binding targets to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2020 and by 50% by 2050, 
as well as setting a target on GHGs, stipulating that 35% of Mexico’s energy will have to 
come from renewable sources by 2024. Similar legislation has been also enacted in the UK in 
2008 with the pledge to reduce GHGs by at least 80% by 2050. Other countries may follow 
                                                 
5  The Kyoto Protocol failed to do this as non-Annex 1 countries, including China, Brazil, South Africa, 
Mexico and Indonesia, did not accept any emission ceilings, while the United States withdrew from the 
agreement. 
6  Such transfers can be either explicit or implicit, through the appropriate choice of trade taxes. See also 
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2013).  
7  Distributional effects are in particular a major concern in many development countries. 
8  See Keen and Kotsogiannis (2013) for a formal description of Pareto-efficient policies when the impact of 
emissions is through utility. See also Sandmo (2005). 
suit. But these promises, even if implemented, will likely fall short of what would be required 
to limit global warming to the required 2oCelcius (the target proposed by the FCCC 
conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and which has been reiterated in all follow-up meetings 
since then).  
 
But why do some countries choose to coordinate and others not? Cost-effective pricing of 
GHGs can be achieved through the linking of national with the international tradeable permit 
system.9 Yet, despite this, and notwithstanding the initial commitment and intentions of many 
countries, little progress has been made on this front.10 One possibility for the lack of 
progress could be, arguably, complex political economy considerations11 relating, in 
particular, to the role of interest groups. It is well-established that the presence of interest 
groups matters for the design and implementation of economic policy—an issue that has not, 
rather surprisingly, received the attention it deserves in the context of international 
agreements.12 The role of pressure groups in the context of international environmental 
cooperation poses some specific challenges. There are several aspects to consider that stretch 
beyond solely domestic policy considerations. It is important to recognise (and also to 
identify the mechanisms how outcomes are determined) that political influence is exerted at 
several stages (but perhaps to a different degree at each) of the decision to cooperate. Political 
pressure might, for instance, shape the incentives to be part of an international agreement 
and, in turn, the emission levels countries target. Even if an agreement is signed, ratification 
and implementation of agreements also become issues for which the role of interest groups 
can be important. It is also clear that interest groups, like NGOs, may lobby across borders, 
and some may have not only national but also international interests.13   
 
The political economy aspects of climate change policy are taken up by Habla and Winkler 
(this issue).14 Focussing on the first two aspects of the political process (that is, whether 
countries join an international permit market and, if they join, which emission level they will 
choose), Habla and Winkler show that participation in an international permit scheme is not 
independent of domestic politics. To the contrary, there is an inherent conflict between 
emission-intensive sectors and consumers which could make participation in an international 
permit scheme difficult to achieve.15 Interestingly, for even the most influential interest 
groups, there are additional factors that may frustrate them in the context of international 
permit trading. The reason for this (and this is an issue that arises in Habla and Winkler) is 
that the benefits derived for the interest groups depend on the balance of two effects; while 
                                                 
9  Such a market would provide the mechanisms and flexibility necessary to achieve an emission target at the 
lowest cost providing also the incentive for other countries to join. 
10  See de Serres et al. (2011). 
11  A typology of these considerations is offered by Ruhl (2012). 
12  Predominantly, the literature on environmental agreements has focused on cooperation between welfare-
maximising governments. The lack of modelling the political process within countries is emphasized in 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1992). Recent contributions that introduce politics into environmental agreements 
are Altamirano-Cabrera (2007), and Dietz et al. (2012). 
13  See Hillman and Ursprung (1994) for an application to trade policy.  
14  A review of the political economy of environmental policy focussing on domestic issues is covered by 
Oates and Portnoy (2003). 
15  See also EBRD (2011). 
they (pressure groups) influence the government to set emission targets that benefit them, the 
strategic inter-play between governments changes the outcome in a way that can be harmful 
for them. If the latter effect dominates the former, interest groups will end up with their less 
preferred outcome.16  
 
It would be also interesting—a point also emphasized in Habla and Winkler—to understand 
the political economy of permit markets when countries form a cooperative international 
climate agreement. It is intuitive—and recent results by Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) 
confirm this—that the allocation scheme in place will play a critical role in whether lobbying 
groups will lend support to the governments to join such a treaty. The low carbon price in the 
EU-ETS is a clear sign how industry lobbies can affect the success of climate policy. It also 
illustrates that interest groups do not only compete in a domestic setting, but that there is 
scope for pressure groups across borders to jointly lobby for their interests. Undoubtedly, 
there is scope for further research on the role of pressure groups in the context of global 
climate policy. This is particularly important for understanding the reasons why, often, 
recommendations by economists do not fall on fertile ground.  
 
Another possibility, and closer to the current policy debate, is the roles of border tax 
adjustments (BTAs) as a credible device for ensuring cooperation. A BTA takes the form of 
imposing a tariff on imports which equals the domestic carbon tax but which is not charged 
abroad. It can also include a refund on exports equal to the carbon tax not charged on the 
production of the same good abroad.17 BTAs have been shown to mitigate carbon leakage 
since the competitive disadvantage of carbon-pricing countries is offset by the BTA. 
Moreover, a BTA is considered as one of the few credible devices by which countries 
implementing carbon pricing can encourage participation by others: participants would 
benefit by imposing a carbon price themselves since by doing so they would capture revenues 
otherwise accruing to others. Against this, however, BTAs risk hiding protectionism—and 
may be inconsistent with the World Trade Organization rules—but also may risk trade 
retaliation. BTAs, perhaps more importantly, also raise the very practical issue of 
implementability, including the need to assess the carbon content of the imported goods. 
Ultimately, the importance of BTAs—both in terms of the magnitude they should take in practice 
as well as the environmental consequences they would give rise to—is an empirical question. 
Though some progress on this issue has been made, clearly, more is needed.18 In all this, political 
economy issues cannot be ignored. For instance, one would expect that a BTA policy is not only 
driven by concerns about the competitive disadvantage of carbon pricing but also the pressures 
originating from interest groups. 
 
Strategic Incentives and Partial Cooperation. Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries can be 
divided into Annex B and non-Annex B countries, the distinction between these two groups 
being that the former accepted emission ceilings while the latter (though signatories to the 
                                                 
16  This observation, albeit in a different context, has been highlighted in, for example, Aidt (2005), and 
Conconi (2003).  
17  See Keen and Kotsogiannis (2013) for a formal characterization of BTAs. 
18  Recent overviews which address the BTA issue include Frankel (2009), and Mattoo et al. (2009). 
Protocol) did not. In this context, the role of ‘offsets’ has become an important feature of the 
global climate architecture, the most well-noted being the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The purpose of offsets is straightforward: Annex B countries can partly meet their 
emission reduction commitments by undertaking emission-reducing projects in non-Annex B 
countries. These offsets thus offer two important advantages: first, they encourage sustainable 
development in non-Annex B (typically developing) countries; second, they allow Annex B 
countries to meet their emission reduction commitments more cheaply. However, the 
question is how do offsets interact with the incentives to set climate change policy? This is an 
issue taken up by Strand (this issue).  
 
Strand divides the world into three blocs: (i) fossil fuel-importing countries which coordinate 
their climate change policy; (ii) fossil fuel-importing countries that take no action in terms of 
setting policy but offer ‘offset’ to the policy group; this group does not coordinate and is 
called the fringe, and (iii) fossil fuel-exporters. Although the latter group has no 
environmental policy in place, as environmental concerns play no role, it can tax exports in 
order to extract monopoly rents from the supply of fossil fuels. In such a framework the 
presence of offsets influences the carbon taxes set by the policy group (and the choice 
between carbon taxes and cap-and-trade).19  
 
With offsets now likely to be an established feature of the global climate architecture, a 
number of issues remain to be addressed.20 For example, if emission targets are set 
endogenously, how does the presence of offsets affect emission targets?21 If cheaper 
abatement options translate into more ambitious abatement targets by the environmental 
policy group, the incentive of the fringe countries to join the policy group may even be 
negatively affected. ‘Additionality’ may be an option to countervail this effect by shifting the 
gains from the offset mechanism from the fringe to the policy group. This may also address 
the problem that many projects financed under CDM would have been implemented anyway 
(see, for instance, Fischer (2005) and Flues et al. (2012)). In addition, the strategic 
manipulation of the efficiency gains from undertaking the projects22 raises a set of interesting 
(and relatively unexplored) issues.23 Dynamic issues—though more analytically complex to 
deal with—also need to be addressed in the context of offset schemes (see Karp et al. 2013). 
For instance, the issues discussed earlier regarding the impact of offsets on environmental 
policy group participation (and, therefore, on the effectiveness of climate agreements) 
become even more important when seen through time. It is clear that if the offset mechanism 
                                                 
19  And so the equivalence between carbon taxation and cap-and-trade. It is well know that the equivalence 
fails if there is imperfect competition in the carbon market or there is uncertainty about the abatement cost 
functions. In the latter case, optimal policy for climate change mitigation favours the use of tax over 
permits (Weitzman 1974). Also volatility of carbon prices maybe greater under cap-and-trade since 
aggregate emissions do not respond flexibly to aggregate shocks, McKibbin (2004).   
20  Not to mention the issue of dealing with countries either non-participating or withdrawing from 
environmental agreements (as in footnote 5). 
21  See Bréchet et al. (2012), and Lessman et al. (2012).  
22  The reason is the dependence of the (implicit) subsidies on a country’s planned (or intended) choice, 
because incentives contingent on the agent’s own behaviour encourage strategic reactions. 
23  See, for instance, Wirl et al. (1998), and Strand and Rosendahl (2012). 
is very attractive for non-Annex B countries, it might be difficult to convince those countries 
to join a future climate treaty and accept emission ceilings.  
 
The extraction decision of competitive firms—and in the absence of externalities—for non-
renewable resources is the one that follows Hotelling’s rule that the price of the resource 
increases at the rate of interest. This rule has been extensively used in various settings to 
determine the optimal path of extraction of carbon-emitting exhaustible resources. But what 
is the optimal path of extraction if there is unilateral emissions policy from a subset of 
countries? Eichner and Pethig (this issue) consider a standard non-renewable resource 
extraction problem with partial ownership of the resource.24 The question they address is 
what is the optimal path of extraction if a subset of countries (forming a uniform policy bloc) 
aims to unilaterally reduce emissions in order to meet a global target (for example, a policy 
ceiling in the sense of global temperature not exceeding the rise in temperatures beyond 2o 
Celsius) being aware of potential leakage effects and facing the constraint to achieve this at 
minimal abatement costs?25 They show that an optimal unilateral policy depends on the 
terms-of-trade incentives (and so whether the unilaterally acting country is an exporter or 
importer of the resource), the distribution of resource ownership and the size of the resource.  
 
International Cooperation, Uncertainty and the Possibility of Catastrophes As noted 
earlier, the challenges to attaining agreement between countries are broad and complex. 
Successful agreements need effective compliance procedures with harsh but also credible 
sanctions that deter countries from not honouring their treaty obligations. This necessitates 
agreements on the principles of monitoring, reporting and verifying: issues that have proved 
particularly contentious in international negotiations (raising sensitive issues of national 
sovereignty too). Future climate treaties will only be successful if the largest current and 
future polluters participate. In light of strong free-rider incentives, this requires ‘clever’ 
designs of climate treaties.26 Uncertainty and learning are likely to be important determinants 
in climate treaty formation (Finus and Pintassilgo, 2012, 2013,  Kolstad, 2007, Kolstad and 
Ulph, 2008, 2011). The role of thresholds—analyzed in the experimental literature on public 
good games (see, for example, Milinski et al., 2008, Dannenberg et al., 2011)—is also likely 
to play an important role. Scott Barrett (this issue) combines these two strands of literature 
and asks the question whether, and under which conditions, the possibility of catastrophic 
events change the incentive structure of countries to join a climate treaty. Barrett shows that 
the threat of a catastrophe changes the nature of the game: a game of cooperation now 
becomes a game of coordination, with an agreement functioning as a coordination device in 
which all countries settle for full cooperation. He demonstrates that the nature of the 
equilibrium does not change if the impact of the catastrophe is uncertain, but it will if there is 
                                                 
24  Optimal extraction in the presence of greenhouse gas emissions has been considered for instance by Ulph 
and Ulph (1994), and Chakraborty et al. (2006). The optimal extraction path depends on the technologies 
that are available to reduce atmospheric CO2. See also Coulomb and Henriet (2010). 
25  The possibility of the green paradox (see Sinn, 2008)—arising because fossil fuel producers shift 
extraction to earlier periods to avoid future (more stringent) climate policies—is being ruled out by 
assumption. 
26  Game-theoretic models on compliance and participation are extensively discussed in Finus (2001, 2003). 
How various designs of treaties influence and interact with participation is also discussed in Finus (2008). 
uncertainty about the threshold of the tipping point (catastrophe). This will also be the case if 
there are multiple thresholds: what uncertainty does in effect, in these cases, is to smooth out 
the discontinuous damage function with catastrophes. Thus, the mere fear of ‘approaching’ 
catastrophes will not automatically solve the problem of lack of cooperation if there is 
uncertainty about the threshold, which is most likely the case.  
 
Whereas Weitzman (2009) has drawn our attention to the potential implications of low 
probability and high impact events for optimal climate policy (see also Millner 2013), Barrett 
(this issue) emphasizes the strategic incentives for international cooperation. Interestingly, the 
introduction of climate change dynamics generates a subtle change in how one addresses the 
question about international cooperation: from the perspective of individual countries, are 
international agreements desirable to limit the gradual path of global emissions or should they 
participate in climate agreements to (only) avoid catastrophic events? This also, naturally, 
leads to the question whether adaptation and climate engineering—as additional options to 
address the climate problem—will also change the incentive structure for coordination and 
cooperation among countries. After all, climate engineering is seen as a back-up option, 
particularly suited before an impending catastrophic event, due to its immediate and cheap 
availability. But it is also a controversial one, given the possibility of high collateral damages. 
Dynamic issues will also be important if there are multiple unknown thresholds (a more 
plausible case than a single threshold). The unequal distribution of the benefits and costs of 
catastrophic events across countries may also impact on the incentives for coordination. And, 
of course—within a dynamic context—uncertainty about thresholds will also complicate 
matters. Climate science suggests that the time path of temperature increases may slow prior 
to catastrophic events which may provide some guidance of how to identify the threshold of 
extreme events, but this conclusion has not yet been confirmed and, hence, is highly 
uncertain.27  
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
There is no doubt that there is a vast and diverse agenda of issues that are still relatively 
unexplored. Theoretical analyses such as the ones displayed in this Special Issue of the 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management can be especially important in 
pushing forward this important and policy-relevant research agenda. Of course, there are 
many more issues still unresolved, but the papers here provide an excellent sample of the 
range of theoretical research in a field of deep intellectual challenges.  
                                                 
27  ‘Critical slowing down’ has been recently highlighted by Scheffer et al. (2012). 
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